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Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary 
perspectives 
Marcus Miller and Ben Zissimos1  




From a wide-ranging historical survey, Acemoglu and Robinson conclude that 
the preservation of liberty depends on being in a ‘narrow corridor’ where there 
is a  balance of power between the state and society. We first examine the 
support Binmore's game-theoretic treatment of Social Contracts provides for 
such a ‘narrow corridor’ of liberty and justice – and what extremes to expect 
without them. We also consider how the biological model of Competing 
Species helps to describe the dynamics of conflicting powers outside the 
narrow corridor– where, as in contemporary Russia and China, any Social 
Contracts that exist are neither free nor fair. 
Keywords: liberty, social contracts, repeated games, Competing Species, 
anarchy, Despotism, Neofeudalism.  
 JEL Codes: C70, C73, P00, Z13  
1. Introduction 
(a) Liberté, Egalité, Empathie 
In Natural Justice, Ken Binmore (2005) explores the conditions needed to 
sustain a Social Contract that can successfully coordinate the activities of 
society. The search is not for some mythical agreement between people and 
their sovereign, however. Nor is it for principles handed down by some 
philosopher from an ivory tower. It is for arrangements that deliver liberty and 
justice, which, he argues must satisfy three conditions: harnessing individual 
incentives, delivering social efficiency and being what society reckons to be 
‘fair’.  
 
1 Acknowledgements: While responsibility for views expressed rests with the authors, we are grateful to  
Daron Acemoglu, Ken Binmore and James Fenske for incisive comments.  
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The prototype to which he appeals are pre-historic, hunter-gatherer societies 
which successfully combined the returns to scale in hunting with private 
incentives for participation, while apparently retaining an egalitarian social 
structure with no overweening bosses. In the final chapter of his book, he 
reveals his own preference -   for a social contract which is free and fair, not 
feudal2. In historical terms, key events cited in the evolution of such ‘contracts’ 
are the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which secured constitutional monarchy 
for Britain3; and the American Declaration of Independence a century later, 
which spelled the end of British colonial rule in that territory.  
Binmore also observes that other social contracts are viable, dubbed 
‘Neofeudal’, which are neither free nor fair (in our terms) but may be efficient; 
and that there are societies with no social contracts in operation – including 
the Utopian but unworkable dreams of Left and Right4. To prevent sliding from 
free and fair social contracts into any of these unattractive alternatives, 
societies have, he argues, often evolved ‘stages of punishment’ for behaviour 
that challenges existing social norms.   
(b) A subtle balance of powers 
Subsequently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2019) have come up with a formula 
which, they claim, will preserve and promote a liberal and just society. This 
involves balancing the powers of people and of state in what they call a Narrow 
Corridor – wherein the prevalence of freedom and fairness resembles that 
under Binmore’s preferred social contract. 
Acemoglu and Robinson trace the emergence of democracy in Britain5 from 
the Magna Carta of 1219 to the Reform Acts of 1832 onwards – and they 
highlight parallel developments in other European states. The case they use in 
their opening chapter to exemplify what they call the ‘Shackled Leviathan’ is, 
however, the United States:   
… a state that creates liberty. It is accountable to society not just because 
it is bound by the U. S. Constitution and by the Bill of Rights, which 
emphatically exalts the rights of the citizens, but more important  because 
 
2 See Annex 3 for more detail and exposition. 
3 bringing to an end the Stuart succession with its hankerings for the ‘divine right of kings’! 
4 with Soviet Russia providing a grim example of a failed utopia of communism.  
5 already analysed in their earlier study of the Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2006) 
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it is shackled by people who will complain, demonstrate, and even rise up 
if it oversteps its bounds. A & R (2019, p.27) 
 (c) Dynamics of contest - or competing species? 
No explicit model of dynamics is offered in their wide-ranging study, though 
paths lying outside the Narrow Corridor are portrayed as generically unstable – 
as indicated in Annex 1 where their iconic diagram demonstrates the contrast 
between paths of positive progress inside the Narrow Corridor and divergent 
paths lying outside.6  Could it be that violating Binmore’s conditions for a 
sustainable contract helps to account for (a) the limited dimensions of the 
Narrow Corridor; and (b) for what might occur outside this corridor? That is 
what we examine in this paper, using a biological model of Competing Species 
for the dynamics outside the corridor. 
(d) Metaphorically speaking 
In an extended and illuminating review of the Narrow Corridor, James Fenske 
(2021) imagines himself in lively conversation with the authors, posing many 
questions and raising objections - weighty enough, apparently, to annoy one of 
the authors and bring things to a close! The approach taken here is a rather 
different. A better metaphor would be that of Ariel Rubinstein (2012), where 
contrasting mechanisms for resource allocation – the market or the jungle - are 
presented as competing courses delivered at imaginary universities.  The two 
imaginary ‘course offerings’ we study here, both focusing on the good society 
(and various, less salubrious, alternatives), are closely complementary, 
however. So our objective is not to select between the two perspectives on 
offer. It is rather to develop a simple analytical approach that weaves together 
key elements of both – and brings out differences where relevant.  
(e) What is to follow 
With this in mind, we begin in Section 2 with an area of close agreement - a 
situation where free and fair Social Contracts prevail, delivering liberty to the 
citizens thanks to an equitable balance of power between them and the state. 
A simple dynamic model is offered as a foil for what may happen in societies 
outside this happy state of affairs. The latter are considered in Section 3, 
where the focus  is on the dynamics of divergence, and the diversity of long-
 
6 Although this iconic ‘phase diagram’ draws substantially on a mathematical model of contest in the 
unpublished NBER of the co-authors, A & R (2017), little is said of this background paper in the volume.  
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run equilibria where Social Contracts may not exist; or, if they do, are not ‘free 
and fair’. Section 4 concludes. 
Although both sources we cite avoid the use of equations, the authors 
nevertheless put diagrams and figures to good use, as indicated in Annex 1 for 
example,  where the iconic figure is effectively a ‘phase portrait’ for the 
Narrow Corridor. Equations are used here – just enough to generate a 
comparable phase portrait!  
 
2. Life with a free and fair Social Contract  
(a) Two concepts of liberty  
From the perspective of evolutionary game theory, Binmore concludes that, to 
be viable, social contracts must satisfy three conditions. First, they must be 
incentive compatible at the individual level (as in a Nash equilibrium); second, 
they must select an efficient equilibrium from the perspective of society as a 
whole (as in the Nash equilibrium of a repeated game with no definite ending);  
and finally they should also be ‘fair’ - according to the power relations of the 
society under consideration. 
To help characterise ‘free and fair’ social contracts he poses the question: 
‘What are the countries in which people are happiest and most productive?’  
 They are the countries with constitutions that protect their citizens from 
tyranny, and guarantee the fair administration of justice. I don’t think any 
of this is accidental or coincidental. I think evolution wrote a yearning for 
freedom and justice into our nature that no amount of social conditioning 
by the Stalins and Hitlers of this world will ever be able to eradicate. 
Binmore (2005, pp.138,9)  
Lest this assessment be dismissed as parochial cultural bias, it should be 
pointed out that Binmore’s characterisation of free and fair contracts is largely 
based on what is known - or can be deduced - of  pre-historic hunter-gatherer 
societies before the transition to farming in the Neolithic Revolution that 
began about 10,000 years BC!  
In modern times, as noted above, Binmore credits the UK and the US with 
having free and fair social contracts in place; and these countries are both 
located securely in the Narrow Corridor by Acemoglu and Robinson. In light of 
this broad agreement, it seems appropriate to model conditions in the Narrow 
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Corridor as satisfying Binmore’s three conditions, which is what we do in this 
section.  
In so doing, however, we stress what Isaiah Berlin (1958), in an inaugural 
lecture on Two concepts of liberty, called negative freedom, i.e. the absence of 
interference – what he referred to as liberty from. (By contrast, the notion of 
positive freedom - liberty to - derives from the wish on the part of the 
individual to be his own master.) As we go to some length in this paper to 
examine the ways in which people may be deprived of their freedom, it is 
hardly surprising that liberty from plays a more significant role in defining life 
in the Narrow Corridor than the positive aspects (of liberty to) described in the 
monographs being studied7. It should be emphasized, therefore, that the 
formal framework described below is not designed to do justice to the positive 
aspects of life inside the corridor, but rather to act as the perfect foil for the 
negative features of life outside.  
(b) A plausible foil? 
As regards life inside the corridor, our focus is on the analogy between the 
concept of fairness that Binmore includes in the definition of a desirable social 
contract and the delicate balancing of powers that Acemoglu and Robinson 
reckon is necessary for liberty. For analytical purposes, we follow Acemoglu 
and Robinson in assuming that social progress requires the coevolution of two 
forces or powers, as they call them, the power of society and that of the state; 
and that these must be kept in reasonable balance for successful coevolution 
to proceed. If so, they are said to lie in the Narrow Corridor – whose width 
defines the limits of imbalance.   
Using the notation of p for power of the people and s for the power of the 
state, both constrained to lie between zero and one8, we assume for 
convenience a common pattern of logistic growth, that of population growth 
given a limited supply of land, so  
     𝑝 ̇ =  𝛽∗(1 − 𝑝)𝑝                                 (1)  
and   
 
7 as for example, in the Allegory of Good Government, A & R (2019, Chap. 5) and The Golden Rule, Binmore 
(2005, Chap, 9). 




     𝑠 ̇ =  𝛽∗(1 − 𝑠)𝑠                                    (2)  
This widely used process, due to Pierre-Francois Verhuist, implies that the 
growth of each power has a limit; and proves convenient for the later 
application of Competing Species dynamics to describe societies where the 
powers are in conflict. 
As shown in Figure 1, the phase portrait for these equations, there are two 
stationary points, one at the origin and the other at (1,1) where both powers 
are fully developed. The diagonal path linking them indicates what happens 
when both move in step; while the off-diagonal paths indicate what happens if 
one or the other is in the lead.  
 
Figure 1 Coevolution with logistic growth 
Given the acceleration of logistic growth around the half-way mark, any delay 
puts the laggard at a potentially significant ‘power disadvantage’; with catch-
up coming only later as the leader asymptotically approaches its maximum. 
Could this competitive disadvantage not trigger what Acemoglu and Robinson 
dub the Red Queen effect ‘where you have to keep on running just to maintain 
your position, like state and society running fast to maintain the balance 
between them' A&R (2019, p. 41)? 
It may be tempting to model the incentive effects involved, and how they may 
change the dynamics that drive progress: this is, indeed, what Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2017) do in their NBER working paper where the dynamics are those 
of a contest – rather like a patent race, where the winner takes all. As the 
(0,0) 𝑝∞ 
s, Power of the State 
p, Power of the People 





formal model plays so little explicit role in their later work, however, we leave 
on one side the detailed dynamics of contest. Instead, to capture the 
incentives to get ahead in a ‘reduced form’ manner, we simply assume that the 
speed of adjustment parameter  𝛽∗  in (1) and (2) is higher than that, labelled 
β, for each power outside the Narrow Corridor. 
The notion of balanced expansion proceeding at an accelerated pace is 
captured most clearly by the diagonal connecting the two points of stationarity 
in Figure 1. But this is surely far too restrictive as a specification of the Narrow 
Corridor9. It can, however, easily be expanded beyond this special case to allow 
for some inequality.  
Consider, for example, the case where one power proceeds as a constant 
fraction of the other. So, for example, let  𝑝 =  𝜑∗𝑠 , 𝜑∗ < 1 where 𝑝 is the 
‘underdog’ (i.e. the weaker power), as illustrated by the dashed line lying 
above the diagonal in Fig 2 which converges ultimately to the point ( 𝜑∗, 1).  
 
Figure 2 Closely balanced growth in a Narrow Corridor 
Note that, if s continues as in (1) above, this will require some speeding up in 
the dynamics of p, specifically  
   𝑝 ̇ = ( 𝛽∗/𝜑∗)(𝜑∗ − 𝑝)𝑝                                                                             (2’)                                                                               
 




s, Power of the State 










This delivers the adjustment needed to compensate for the reduction in the 
long run capacity (from 1 to 𝜑∗) and ensure matching growth10.  
Given our emphasis on the negative sense of liberty – i.e. freedom from -  what 
is important here is what is ruled out - so there is no coercion of people by the 
state, nor do the people prevent the emergence of a political hierarchy. There 
is, therefore, no Tyranny nor Justice bound, no War nor Desolation – features 
that Acemoglu and Robinson associate with Despotic and Absent Leviathans.  
While there is no explicit modelling of positive interaction between the two 
powers, the increased speed of adjustment indicates that coevolution provides  
a positive externality. It has to be admitted that this characterisation lacks the 
frenzy of positive-sum competition in the contest model of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2017) - involving the ‘all or nothing’ payoffs of the race for a new 
patent. It is perhaps more akin to the frescoes of Ambrogio Lorenzetti that 
they use to illustrate the nature and effects of Good Government in the city of 
Sienna, offered as an example of life in the Narrow Corridor, A&R (2019, 
Chapter 5 with photo insert between pp. 268,9).  
(b) So why is the Corridor Narrow11?  
In defining their corridor, Acemoglu and Robinson postulate a limit to the 
imbalance between the powers consistent with the peaceful coexistence 
characterised there – where, for convenience, we can take  𝜑∗  shown in Figure 
2  to indicate the corridor limit. If we are to assume that conditions in the 
Narrow Corridor satisfy Binmore’s three conditions for the sustainability of a 
‘free and fair’ social contract, how to explain why increased imbalance leads to 
unsustainability?  
To do this, we first outline how exogenous events may change the set of 
Feasible Social Contracts available to society, and how this can change the 
existing equilibrium, using the terminology and analytical methods of Binmore 
(2005). We then discuss how, with no change in the set of feasible contracts, 
deviant behaviour can also threaten a change of equilibrium. In this way we 
can treat the structure developed by Binmore as supplying the philosophical 
 
10 For > 𝑠  , so p is ‘top dog’,  the same logic will lead to convergence to the point shown as (1, 𝜑∗)   in Figure 
2. 
 
11 Incorporating revisions suggested by Ken Binmore.  
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foundations for the limits to the Narrow Corridor that Acemoglu and Robinson 
describe, and for clues as to what may take place outside this corridor. 
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expansion of the set of Feasible Social Contracts due to technological change  
is treated in the Annex 2, which serves to illustrate Binmore’s logic. This 
expansion shifts the Nash Bargaining Solution from an initial equilibrium with 
equitable sharing, to one which is decisively more favourable to one of the 
parties. In the short run, the share of the party out of favour is ‘protected’ by 
the social indices (SI) associated with the original equilibrium. But this is not 
true in the medium run when cultural factors lead to a revision of these 
weights, as the revised Nash Bargaining Solution calls for a much lower ranking 
in society (lower SI) for the party out of favour.  
Even without technological change that alters the set of feasible social 
contracts, however, there may be random patterns of behaviour that threaten 
the existing fair equilibrium12. In the hunter-gather context, for example, 
individuals ‘acting bossy’ may threaten a shift to other efficient but unfair 
equilibria. As Binmore indicates, such shifts can be checked by escalating 
‘punishment strategies’ – first Laughter, then Boycotting and finally Expulsion -  
that support the current equilibrium. The point at which such strategies get 
implemented effectively mark the limits to the imbalance of power consistent 
with the existing fair equilibrium -   limits that correspond to edges of the 
narrow corridor of A and R ( as shown graphically by 𝜑∗  in Figure 2).  
This, we believe, is how the application of Binmore’s social contract theory 
helps explain the Narrow Corridor. At the edge of the corridor, the bossy 
individual may conform or get expelled: if not, he or she can put the existing 
set of social weights under pressure they can no longer bear. What then?  
One possibility is that, having disrupted the basis of the existing social contract, 
the unchecked seeker-after-power can impose what Binmore calls a Neofeudal 
social contract - in which he or she is given a much higher Social Index than 
before. So society retains a social contract, but one with a much more unequal 
distribution of power than before.  
Alternatively, the breakdown of the original social contract may lead to the 
emergence of anti-social forces previously held in check - forces which can 
undermine the viability of any social contract. Specifically we assume that the 
 
12 See the discussion of ‘evolutionary drift’ in Binmore (2021). 
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party favoured with greater power seeks to shift the set of Feasible Social 
Contracts so as to disfavour the other party. But determined efforts to 
’disenfranchise’ any opposition may well undermine the efficiency conditions 
needed for a sustainable social contract, rendering the set of Feasible Social 
Contracts empty.  
How, when  φ < 𝜑∗  , adverse outcomes may emerge13 to replace the norms 
of civilised societies enjoying freedom and justice, is what we examine next. 
 
3. Paradise lost   
In the sections that follow, the Competing Species approach14 is employed with 
two objectives in mind. First to see how, with no workable social contract, 
conflict can drive society to extremes of Despotism or Hobbesian ‘warre’: and 
second to study the operation of Neofeudal social contracts.  
(a) The slippery slope to Despotism 
The breakdown of social norms that hold its power in check can lead to ever-
increasing dominance by the state. As Acemoglu and Robinson put it15 :    
Starting with greater initial levels of state and elite power than societal 
power … the configuration favors the emergence of the Despotic 
Leviathan. Here the arrows travel towards yet higher levels of state 
power. In the meantime, the power of society gets eroded as society finds 
itself no match for the state. This tendency is exacerbated as the Despotic 
Leviathan works to emasculate society so that it remains unshackled. In 
consequence, over time the Despotic Leviathan becomes overwhelmingly 
powerful relative to a meek society. A&R (2019, p.65) [emphasis added] 
To construct a phase portrait that matches these words – and comes close to 
matching their iconic figure, we use a Competing Species approach to see how 
the state ‘works to emasculate society’. The essential idea is that the state uses 
its power, in negative fashion, to slow the progress of the underdog – possibly 
to the point of extinction.   
Consider the system where  𝑠 > 𝑝 , i.e. above the diagonal in Figure 3, so the 
state is ‘top dog’ and can impose adverse conditions that the people will no 
 
13 More details, and an expositional figure, are presented in Annex 3  
14 As described in Arrowsmith and Place (1992, Chap. 5), for example. 
15 with reference to their iconic diagram, shown in Annex 1 
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longer have ‘freedom from’.  Assume specifically that it acts to reduce the 
growth of people-power by a term 𝛾𝑠 that reflects its own superiority, so:                             
𝑝 ̇ =  𝛽(1 − 𝑝 −  𝛾𝑠)𝑝                                     (3)  
while its own state power evolves unchecked much as before, so 
 𝑠 ̇ =  𝛽(1 − 𝑠)𝑠                                                  (4)  
except that convergence is now slower than in the Narrow Corridor as 𝛽 <  𝛽∗.  
How this affects the phase diagram is shown in Figure 3. The point of 
stationarity at the origin remains unchanged; but the other point of stationarity 
moves from (1,1) to (1- γ, 1), i.e. to the point where the ‘isoclines’ of the above 
equations, namely   𝑠 = 1 and  𝑝 +  𝛾𝑠 = 1, intersect. If, for example, we set 
𝛾 = 1   so   𝑠 +  𝑝 = 1, this gives the stationary point (0,1) shown at the top 
left of the figure.  
 
 Figure 3 When power corrupts: and the off-diagonal dynamics it can induce  
While the origin is an unstable node, the other point of stationarity is stable16. 
Further detail of the dynamics can be obtained by sketching the phase portrait. 
Given the isoclines shown in the figure where 𝑝 ̇ = 0  and  𝑠 ̇ = 0 ,  the 
directions of motion are obtained by recognizing that 𝑝 ̇  and  𝑠 ̇   take positive 
and negative values indicated by the arrows in the figure17.  
 
16 Established formally by examining the eigenvalues of the linearized system of dynamics 𝒚 ̇ =  𝑾𝒚 at (0,1), 
where y are the local coordinates at the fixed point, Arrowsmith and Place(1992, p.181).  
17 and note that 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑝
>  1  where s=p 
(0,0) 𝑝∞ 
s, Power of the State 
p, Power of the People 










Together with the nature of the fixed points, this suffices to construct the 
phase portrait18 sketched in Figure 3, with the stable point of convergence at 
(0,1) where people-power is finally reduced to zero.   
If one treats the suppression of people’s rights and powers as corruption, one 
could say that the point of convergence bears out Lord Acton’s dictum: “Power 
tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”!   
 (b) The opposite case: Hobbesian anarchy 
By condoning action to cripple state power, a breakdown of social norms 
prevailing in the Narrow Corridor can significantly reduce the power of a weak 
state in the long run. It may even lead to the elimination of state power in the 
Hobbesian case, captured here by setting γ=1.  
To see this, consider the phase portrait for ≤ 𝑝 . As the people have more 
power, p continues much as before, so    
  𝑝 ̇ =  𝛽(1 − 𝑝)𝑝                                     (5)  
except that convergence is now slower than in the Narrow Corridor as 𝛽 <  𝛽∗.  
For 𝑠 <  𝑝, however, the growth rate of the state will be impeded by  − 𝛾𝑝 , a 
term designed to capture how the people will try to ‘cripple the power of 
elites’, so  
 𝑠 ̇ =  𝛽(1 − 𝑠 −  𝛾𝑝)𝑠                             (6)  
Assuming the ‘growth-blocking’ term − 𝛾𝑝  only applies for  𝑠 < 𝜑∗𝑝 < 𝑝 , this 
will generate dynamics as shown below the diagonal in Figure 4 for the case 
where = 1 . This corresponds broadly with what Acemoglu and Robinson 
predict for the Absent Leviathan with a trajectory that 
begins where society is more powerful than the state and can stymie the 
emergence of powerful centralized state institutions. The fear of the 
slippery slope19 implies that where possible, society will try to cripple the 
power of elites and undercut the political hierarchy, so the power of state-
like entities declines further, and the Absent Leviathan gets established 
even more firmly. A&R (2019, p.65) [emphasis added]  
 
18 As the Narrow Corridor offers ‘freedom from’ such aggressive behaviour, the divergent phase path is only 
shown for points outside it.  
19 i.e. to Despotism 
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Figure 4 When social norms operate - and when they break down, for 𝛾 = 1  
Overall, the phase diagram of Figure 4, based on the dynamics of Competing 
Species, broadly matches the dynamics of Acemoglu and Robinson, though it is 
rather more extreme in that the limit points occur only when the ‘top dog’ has 
absolute power.    
Binmore has, however, alerted us to another distinct and disturbing possibility 
not discussed by Acemoglu and Robinson - that of ‘smart Despotism’ where a 
social contract remains in place - but not one that he would recognise as free 
and fair. Is this consistent with our dynamic framework?  
(c) Neofeudal Social Contracts: dead men pay no taxes 
After the conquest of Kansou by Gengis Khan, it is said that one of his Mongol 
generals proposed that the new Chinese subjects be put to the sword and the 
land converted into pasturage for the cavalry. What then? 
It took all the skill of one of the sovereign’s counsellors to reject this 
project. He had to demonstrate to the conqueror the advantages to be 
had from cultivated land and an active population. He enumerated in 
detail all that could be raised each year by taxes on land and on 
production. So it was that the conquered Chinese territories were saved 
from pillage, and divided in ten departments run by Mongol office-holders 
assisted by Chinese officials. Ardant (1971, p. 30) 
In similar vein, it is on record that, in the 8th century AD, Calif Omar persuaded 
the conquerors of Iraq and Syria not to seize and divide up the land, but to 
(0,0) 𝑝∞ 
s, Power of the State 
p, Power of the People 









leave the conquered population in possession - so long as they paid kharadj (a 
land tax) and a capitation fee, Ardant (1971, p. 29).  
Could this principle - that constraining the exercise of absolute power may 
sometimes pay a dividend - be what motivates the Neo-feudal Social Contracts 
that Binmore refers to? They may not be ‘free nor fair’, but they can promote  
efficiency and profit.  
At first sight, it might seem that the formal framework we use here implies 
that - outside the Narrow Corridor -  there are no viable social contracts. For, 
like the ‘unworkable Utopias’ in Binmore’s diagram in Annex 3, the  ‘corner 
solutions’ of outright Dictatorship and of Hobbesian ‘warre’ in Figure 4 have 
been analysed above as cases which fail to satisfy necessary conditions for 
sustainability.   
But these corner solutions arise from setting a specific high value for ‘growth-
blocking’, both 𝛾  terms being set at unity. For smaller values, the point of 
stationarity will move in from the corner. This is shown in Figure 6 for the case 
where the state as ‘top dog’ sets  1 >  𝛾𝑛 >  0 .  (This has the effect of 
swivelling the isocline for ?̇?  clockwise so as give a stationary point at                 
(1 − 𝛾𝑛, 1),  where  1 − 𝛾𝑛   gives some indication of the power imbalance 
relevant for a Neofeudal Social Contract20. ) So, we argue, a Neofeudalist Social 
Contract can exist if 𝛾𝑛 lies sufficiently below unity.  
So society will not be as fair as needed for the Social Contract inside the 
Narrow Corridor, but things are sufficiently well-organised as to satisfy the 
criteria for individual incentives and social efficiency; and the power imbalance 
is consistent with the power relations of the society as it has evolved. 
 
 
20 Note that the isoclines do not meet on the diagonal as the growth blocking term for the regime below the 




Figure 5 Long run equilibrium with a Neofeudal Social Contract. 
 
While Soviet Russia may be identified with the corner solution of Figure 4, 
Russia under Putin might better be represented by the Neofeudal Contract of 
Figure 5. For, without going as far as Guriev and Triesman (2020) in claiming 
that ‘informational autocracy’ has replaced repression, it is clear that Putin has 
decided against the mass repression of Stalin, opting for a style of dictatorship 
which targets its violence on those – like Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexei 
Navalny  - who dare openly to challenge Presidential power in political terms. 
China under President-for-life Xi Jinpeng represents another case of what we 
would regard as an unfair and unfree Social Contract; but in this instance there 
is no pretence of a multi-party system being in operation. 
We conclude that Acton’s Dictum is not the last word. Absolute power may 
well corrupt; but leaving the people with enough agency to run an efficient 
society may be better for the leader than crushing them completely.   
4. Conclusion    
Two accounts of what constitutes a free and just society have been discussed 
metaphorically like different, but complementary, courses at an imaginary 
institute of learning. So what has been learned from trying to weave them 
together?  
Both accounts concur in describing a rather precarious Narrow Corridor where 
forces inimical to liberty and justice are held in check. To leave this safe space 
(0,0) 𝑝∞ 
s, Power of the State 
p, Power of the People 






𝜑∗ 1 − 𝛾𝑛 
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is like passing a tipping point where ‘top dogs’ get unleashed to bully 
‘underdogs’ -  to use the analogy suggested by the Competing Species 
approach. 
The alternatives to freedom and justice are however manifold. First of all, 
there is the key issue of who takes control: will it be an overweening state or 
will there be rule by the mob – a Despotic Leviathan or one that is Absent? 
(Currently, indeed, the risk of mob rule may have increased thanks to modern 
forms of communication that undermine the sustainability of Social Contracts, 
see Binmore, 2021 21.)  
Beyond this basic divide, there is a key issue posed in the final Chapter of  
Natural Justice: how will overweening power be used? For those in control 
may choose to rule without a Social Contract, terrifying the people with 
unchecked repression like Stalin with the Gulag and the Great Terror. 
Alternatively, as ‘smart’ dictators, they may seek to promote a new Social 
Contract that harnesses the energy of the people so as to advance their own 
ends in ‘top down’ fashion.  
The latter seems better to describe what Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinpeng seek to 
achieve. Rather than a collapse into anarchy or into Stalinesque repression – 
the two prospects that Acemoglu and Robinson consider - it is surely the 
promotion of such Neofeudalistic conditions that, on the global stage, 
presently poses the main challenge to ‘free and fair’ contracts. 
There is no denying that both accounts of the free and just society studied 
here are susceptible to Fenske’s critique – of underplaying or ignoring the role 
of external pressures and opportunities. For more enlightenment on this, one 
might enrol in parallel courses on the rise and fall of empires; and on the risks 
of conflict that Thucydides warned of long ago, when Athens felt threatened by 






21 The use of social media to coordinate an attack on Congress when voting on a handover of power in January 
2021 is an example of what he has in mind.  
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Annex 1  Acemoglu and Robinson’s iconic diagram illustrating the Narrow 
Corridor  
The framework of Acemoglu and Robinson (2019), reproduced in the Figure below, employs 
Hobbes’s terminology, in that the term ‘Leviathan’ is used to refer to the state. The authors 
explain the variable on the horizontal axis refers to ‘how powerful a society is in terms of its 
norms, practices and institutions, especially when it comes to acting collectively, 
coordinating its actions and constraining political hierarchy.’  The variable on the vertical 
axis ‘similarly combines several aspects including the power of political and economic elites 




Figure A1 The evolution of Despotic, Shackled and Absent Leviathans    
As illustrated in what is essentially a ‘phase diagram’, they distinguish three ‘regimes’, one 
of progressive Disorder, another of growing Despotism (shown respectively below and 
above the diagonal), leaving a Narrow Corridor for positive Democratic development in 
between.  
It should be added that these dynamic paths are subject to substantial shocks – treated as 
discrete changes in ‘initial conditions’ - the collapse of the USSR (with the end of the explicit 
monopoly of the Communist party) to take a recent example. In general, such shocks can 
have substantial long-run effects as they may lead to ‘crossing the border’ from one regime 
to another. Not in this specific case, however, as the view expressed by the authors is that 
the degree of State power in Russia, though diminished, is still too great for democracy. So 
Russia still lies outside and above the Narrow Corridor, A& R (2019, p. 268).23 
Unsurprisingly, China is located there too; while the US and UK are placed within the Narrow 
Corridor.  
Annex 2 Fairness: Technical Progress and the case for Levelling Up 
Using the framework outlined in Natural Justice ( based in turn on Chapter 4 of Just Playing, 
Binmore, 1998), we outline the impact of an unanticipated asymmetric change in possibility 
set of social outcomes, designated as the set of ‘feasible social contracts’, FSC. Using what  
Binmore calls the Egalitarian approach,24 the implications for a ‘fair’ social contract in both 
 
23 This is a much more gloomy assessment than that implied by the ‘theory of informational autocracy’ of 
Guriev and Treisman (2020). 
24 as relevant when there is no adequate external enforcement, see Binmore (2005, p. 175).   
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short and medium term are indicated below. This leads to an obvious interpretation of the 
call for Levelling Up. 
The fair outcome following an exogenous asymmetric change in the possibility set  
  
Figure A1. The fair outcome given by pre-existing social weights 
  
(1) Given X, the original FSC, find Nash bargaining solution of the coordination problem, see 
N. 
(2) Choose the Social Indices, SI, (i.e. societal weights on each player) to make Egalitarian 
solution, E coincide with N. This involves choosing weights so as to determine the ray from D 
which intersects the boundary of X at N, where the slope of the ray is (SI Eve)/(SI Adam), 
roughly ½  in the Figure.  
Now assume there is an exogenous ‘manna from heaven’ technological innovation which 
favours Adam as it expands the set from X to Y, see Figure.  
(3) The Egalitarian solution for the fair social contract is where the ray from D to E intersects 
the boundary of Y at F (i.e. with SI adapted to pre-existing feasible set X) 
(4) In the medium run, it is argued that cultural evolution will eventually change the SI so 
that they adapt to the new Nash bargaining solution N’. As this requires shifting 
consumption towards Adam away from Eve, it requires a flatter ray from D through N’, 
involving a lowering of Eve’s SI relative to Adam’s. 
Technical Comment 
As constructed, the Egalitarian account implies a more equal distribution of consumption in 
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closely follow the rightward shift of the possibility set as the Utilitarian account does. As it 
happens in this instance that the U solution at V and the E solution lie on opposite sides of 
the medium term Nash bargaining solution, they both call for a rise in Adam’s SI in the 
medium run.  
Application to Levelling Up  
Let Eve represent those Left Behind in UK society, i.e. those who have not benefitted from 
‘manna from heaven’ Technical Progress as the group represented by Adam has.  
Questions: Will the situation threaten the social fabric? what, if anything, need be done? 
Answer: As indicated, those Left Behind do get an increase in welfare in the short run. But 
the medium run Nash Bargaining Solution is less favourable than the short run outcome. 
This is because the current egalitarian norms call for a fairer sharing of consumption than 
the asymmetric evolution of the FSC will imply. 
One interpretation of Levelling Up is that it is an attempt to avoid this essentially by 
correcting for the asymmetric nature of the expansion of the FSC? If the Levelling Up was to 
lead to a uniform expansion of the FSC X, for example, then not only will the associated 
Egalitarian solution be more generous, see F in the figure below; it will also prevail into the 
medium term as it coincides with the Nash bargaining solution, see N’ in the figure.  
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Annex 3 If contracts are not free and fair, what then? Binmore (2005, chap 12). 
What should one expect of conditions outside of a Narrow Corridor in which liberty and 
justice prevail? What is it that a free and fair Social Contract provides freedom from?  
The final chapter of Natural Justice, where Binmore categorizes political attitudes in respect 
of how they rate freedom and fairness, provides an answer, summarized in Figure 3 below.  
 
 
Figure A3 Binmore’s classification of political attitudes – with 3 specific cases 
Binmore is explicit as to his own preference for a ‘free and fair’ social contract, shown at the 
top of the diagram and dubbed as Whiggery (after the political party that opposed the Tory 
party in Parliament in the 18th century).  On the bold assumption that Whiggery 
corresponds to life inside the Narrow Corridor, the rest of the Figure indicates what is to be 
to expected outside – i.e. the unpleasant regimes that the Narrow Corridor offers freedom 
from.   
There are evidently two broad possibilities. 
‘Neofeudal’ contracts 
First is the operation of social contracts in societies that delegate the coordination of 
collective decisions to individuals or elites. While unattractive to those with ‘whiggish’ 
 















preferences, such Neofeudal contracts must, by definition, satisfy the three prerequisites - 
of stability, efficiency and fairness - specified earlier.  
In this context, however, fairness will reflect the existing power relations of the society in 
question – not the egalitarian relationships thought to have characterised hunter-gather 
societies, nor those prized highly by those with Whiggish preferences!  
Unworkable utopias 
The other possibility is that of ‘unworkable utopias’, be they of left and right. The left-wing 
vision, labelled utilitarianism, is  dismissed as unworkable ‘because nothing can prevent the 
bosses in an authoritarian society from becoming acquisitive’; while the right-wing vision, of 
libertarianism,  ‘because possessions cannot be held securely in an anarchic society’25.  
That such utopias are impractical is implicit in the label itself. For Binmore, however, 
unworkability needs to be demonstrated with reference to his specified prerequisites for a 
social contract to be sustainable. Thus we are warned that utilitarianism  ‘won’t work 
because it fails to recognise the first priority’; and, even if it is modified to take account of 
individual incentives, there will still be trouble at the next level – social efficiency. This point 
is made forcefully with the aid of a specific example – Soviet Russia.  
‘An efficient social contract will necessarily grant a substantial amount of freedom to a 
wide variety of freedom to a wide variety of individuals at all levels of the production 
process. … The fall of the Soviet empire makes it unnecessary to press this point 
further. Even erstwhile Marxists now agree that command economies are hopelessly 
inefficient. This would seem to be one of the few clear lessons that history has to 
teach. Some measure of individual freedom is a necessary condition for an innovative 
society. Binmore (2005, p. 189) 
The critique of right-wing libertarians is mainly directed at those who ‘think that everything 
should just be left to the market’, and starts with the observation that state power is 
needed to protect the property rights of entrepreneurs. This is supplemented with the 
difficulty of securing efficient bargains when information is not evenly shared and the need 
to regulate monopolies, to mention two further issues that count against libertarianism per 
se providing a viable social contract.  
 
25 i.e. what Acemoglu and Robinson might label as ‘the lure of Despotism’ and the ‘threat of lawlessness’ 
respectively. 
